베이즈주의 과학철학
- 제목: 과학방법론연구: 베이즈주의 과학철학
- (2007 가을, 서울대학교 목요일 저녁 6시-9시)
- 교수: 여영서
과목 소개
‘베이즈주의’라는 이름은 베이즈(T. Bayes) 신부가 베이즈의 정리(Bayes's Theorem)를 제시한데서 기원한다. 그렇지만 베이즈주의는 베이즈의 정리를 가리키는 것도 아니고 베이즈의 사상을 가리키는 것도 아니다. 베이즈주의는 철학적, 수학적, 통계학적, 컴퓨터 공학적 요소를 결집시킨 확률론적 과학방법론이라고 할 수 있다. 최근 다양한 학문 분야에서 관심을 끌고 있는 베이즈주의는 철학적으로도 입증(confirmation) 이론을 중심으로 과학철학과 인식론의 중요한 축을 형성하고 있다. 본 세미나는 베이즈주의 입증 이론을 중심으로, 베이즈주의가 과학철학과 인식론의 이슈들을 어떻게 그리고 얼마나 성공적으로 해결하고 있는지를 생각해 볼 것이다.
본 세미나의 주제에 대해 좀 더 탐구하고 싶다면 다음 글 참조.
- Talbott, W., "Bayesian Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2007 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-bayesian/
교재
- Strevens, M. (manuscript) (2007), Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory
- Howson, C. & Urbach, P. (2006), Scientific Reasoning
- Horwich, P. (1982), Probability and Evidence
- Earman, J. (1992), Bayes or Bust?
- Glymour, C. (1980), Theory and Evidence
- Van Fraassen, B. C. (1989), Laws and Symmetry
- Salmon, W. (1990), "Rationality and Objectivity in Science, or Tom Kuhn meets Tom Bayes" in C. W. *Savage (ed.) Scientific Theories, 1990.
- Strevens, M. (1999), "Objective Probabilities as a Guide to the World", Philosophical Studies 95: 243–75.
- Strevens, M. (2004), "Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Inductive Logic or Mere Inductive Framework?", Synthese 141:365–379.
- Wayne, A. (1995), "Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence", Philosophy of Science, 62(1): 111–121.
일부 강의 자료는 http://cafe.daum.net/formalphilosophy
1. Introduction
2. How Bayesianism Works 1
3. How Bayesianism Works 2
- Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Ch. 5.
- Strevens (1999), "Objective Probabilities as a Guide to the World"
4. Modern Bayesianism in Action
5. Problem of Induction & Problems of Confirmation
- Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Chs. 7-8.
- Strevens (2004), "Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Inductive Logic or Mere Inductive Framework?"
- Horwich (1982), pp. 54-63, 118-122.
- Wayne (1995),“Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence”
6. Subjectivity of Bayesiansim 1
- Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Ch. 9
- Salmon, "Plausibility Arguments in Science", 65-67, 74-82.
7. Auxiliary and Ad Hoc Hypotheses
- Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Ch. 10
- Howson & Urbach (2006), pp. 103-114, 118-126.
8. Old Evidence Problem
- Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Ch. 11
- Glymour (1980), pp. 85-93
- H&U (2006), pp. 297-302
- Earman (1992), Ch. 5
9. Bayes and Kuhn
- H&U (2006), pp. 265-297
- Earman (1992), Ch. 8
10. Objective Bayesianism
- Maher "The Concept of Inductive Probability"
- Maher "Subjective and Objective Confirmation"
- Williamson "Objective Bayesianism"
- van Fraassen (1989), Ch. 12.
11. Measuring Confirmation
- Schlesinger, "Measuring degrees of confirmation"
- Eells & Fitelson (2000), "Comments and Criticism: Measuring Confirmation and Evidence", The Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000), pp. 663-672.
- Fitelson (1999), "The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity", Philosophy of Science 66 (1999), pp. S362-378.
12. Predictivism
- Maher, "How Prediction Enhances Confirmation"
- Barnes, "Predictivism for Pluralists"
13. Bayesian Nets and Causation
- Hitchcock, "5. Causal Modeling and Probabilistic Causation", in "Probabilistic Causation" from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Pearl, "Epilogue: The Art and Science of Cause and Effect" in Causality
14. Bayesianism and Scientific Judgment
- Giere, "Scientific Judgment"
- Vranas, "Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky"