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"The Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists"의 두 판 사이의 차이
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The Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists (원본 보기)
2025년 12월 25일 (목) 15:52 판
, 2025년 12월 25일 (목) 15:52→5. Concluding Remarks
(새 문서: == 본문 == {{제목|Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists}} {{부제|실재론자와 반실재론자의 상보적 역할}} 정동욱 <b>Abstract.</b> I will show th...) |
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Kuhn (1987) said that it is difficult to modify our belief system piecemeal due to the locally holistic character of our belief system. If we want to modify a part of our belief system, we have to modify the related parts together. However, we cannot modify the whole system altogether without modifying parts piecemeal. Piecemeal change like the diagram (Fig. 1) is impossible, because the transitional states are impossible. Then how could scientific revolutions have happened? | Kuhn (1987) said that it is difficult to modify our belief system piecemeal due to the locally holistic character of our belief system. If we want to modify a part of our belief system, we have to modify the related parts together. However, we cannot modify the whole system altogether without modifying parts piecemeal. Piecemeal change like the diagram (Fig. 1) is impossible, because the transitional states are impossible. Then how could scientific revolutions have happened? | ||
[[파일:Impossible piecemeal change.png|가운데|프레임|Fig 1. Impossible piecemeal change.]] | |||
A solution to the Kuhn’s dilemma came from the complementary roles of realists and anti-realists. Firstly, some scientists, like anti-realists, can accept new ideas as fictional models not as reality. Accepting an idea as a fictional model (not as reality) lightens the heavy burden of holistic modification of our belief system. They can construct, keep, and develop several models free from their own belief system. Later, some scientists can recognize the possibility of integrating those ideas in to a complete system and accept them as true (Fig. 2). Paradoxically, their realist acceptance would result from the accumulation of fictional models and their confidence in successfully constructing a new system. | A solution to the Kuhn’s dilemma came from the complementary roles of realists and anti-realists. Firstly, some scientists, like anti-realists, can accept new ideas as fictional models not as reality. Accepting an idea as a fictional model (not as reality) lightens the heavy burden of holistic modification of our belief system. They can construct, keep, and develop several models free from their own belief system. Later, some scientists can recognize the possibility of integrating those ideas in to a complete system and accept them as true (Fig. 2). Paradoxically, their realist acceptance would result from the accumulation of fictional models and their confidence in successfully constructing a new system. | ||
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Wallace, W. A. (1971), “Mechanics from Bradwardine to Galileo”, <i>Journal of the History of the Ideas </i>32, 15-28. | Wallace, W. A. (1971), “Mechanics from Bradwardine to Galileo”, <i>Journal of the History of the Ideas </i>32, 15-28. | ||
Wallace, W. A. (1981), <i>Prelude to Galileo: Essays on Medieval and Sixteenth-Century Sources of | Wallace, W. A. (1981), <i>Prelude to Galileo: Essays on Medieval and Sixteenth-Century Sources of Galileo’s Thought</i>, D. Reidel Publishing Company. | ||
Westman, R. S. (1975), “Three Responses to the Copernican Theory: Johannes Praetorius, Tycho Brahe, and Michael Maestlin”, in R. S. Westman (ed.), <i>The Copernican Achievement</i>, (pp. 285-345). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. | Westman, R. S. (1975), “Three Responses to the Copernican Theory: Johannes Praetorius, Tycho Brahe, and Michael Maestlin”, in R. S. Westman (ed.), <i>The Copernican Achievement</i>, (pp. 285-345). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. | ||