"The Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists"의 두 판 사이의 차이

Kuhn (1987) said that it is difficult to modify our belief system piecemeal due to the locally holistic character of our belief system. If we want to modify a part of our belief system, we have to modify the related parts together. However, we cannot modify the whole system altogether without modifying parts piecemeal. Piecemeal change like the diagram (Fig. 1) is impossible, because the transitional states are impossible. Then how could scientific revolutions have happened?  

Kuhn (1987) said that it is difficult to modify our belief system piecemeal due to the locally holistic character of our belief system. If we want to modify a part of our belief system, we have to modify the related parts together. However, we cannot modify the whole system altogether without modifying parts piecemeal. Piecemeal change like the diagram (Fig. 1) is impossible, because the transitional states are impossible. Then how could scientific revolutions have happened?  

A solution to the Kuhn’s dilemma came from the complementary roles of realists and anti-realists. Firstly, some scientists, like anti-realists, can accept new ideas as fictional models not as reality. Accepting an idea as a fictional model (not as reality) lightens the heavy burden of holistic modification of our belief system. They can construct, keep, and develop several models free from their own belief system. Later, some scientists can recognize the possibility of integrating those ideas in to a complete system and accept them as true (Fig. 2). Paradoxically, their realist acceptance would result from the accumulation of fictional models and their confidence in successfully constructing a new system.

A solution to the Kuhn’s dilemma came from the complementary roles of realists and anti-realists. Firstly, some scientists, like anti-realists, can accept new ideas as fictional models not as reality. Accepting an idea as a fictional model (not as reality) lightens the heavy burden of holistic modification of our belief system. They can construct, keep, and develop several models free from their own belief system. Later, some scientists can recognize the possibility of integrating those ideas in to a complete system and accept them as true (Fig. 2). Paradoxically, their realist acceptance would result from the accumulation of fictional models and their confidence in successfully constructing a new system.

Because fictional models do not have to be a necessary part of our belief system, we can create and accumulate them in storage outside of our belief system. In addition, a model, once constructed, can be an external object to be accessed, understood, manipulated, and modified by many people not just by individuals who believe the model is real. After all, this modeling strategy is a valuable method for constructing, keeping, conveying, and developing an immature but critical idea.  

Because fictional models do not have to be a necessary part of our belief system, we can create and accumulate them in storage outside of our belief system. In addition, a model, once constructed, can be an external object to be accessed, understood, manipulated, and modified by many people not just by individuals who believe the model is real. After all, this modeling strategy is a valuable method for constructing, keeping, conveying, and developing an immature but critical idea.