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The Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists (원본 보기)

2025년 12월 25일 (목) 16:08 판

146 바이트 추가됨 ,  2025년 12월 25일 (목) 16:08
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DongWook JUNG, "Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists", The Korean Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27(3) (2024), 35-56.
DongWook JUNG, "The Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists", The Korean Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27(3) (2024), 35-56.


'''국문 초록.''' 이 논문에서 나는 14-17세기 실재론자들과 반실재론자들 사이의 실천적인 차이가 천문학과 역학의 발전에서 상보적인 역할을 수행했음을 보일 것이다. 첫째, 해당 시기 유럽의 전형적인 실재론자와 반실재론자―14세기의 토머스주의자(실재론) 대 유명론자(반실재론), 16세기의 코페르니쿠스(실재론) 대 도구주의 천문학자들(반실재론), 17세기의 갈릴레오(실재론) 대 그의 반대파들(반실재론)―사이에는 과학적 실천에서 분명한 차이가 있었다. 둘째, 실재론자와 반실재론자 그룹 각각의 기여는 다른 그룹에 의해 대체될 수 없었기에, 양쪽의 기여는 협동을 통해 과학의 발전을 추동했다. 추가적으로, 나는 이러한 실재론자과 반실재론자들의 상보적인 역할이 쿤식 전체론이 가진 딜레마에 대한 한 가지 해법을 제공할 수 있음을 보일 것이다.  
'''국문 초록.''' 이 논문에서 나는 14-17세기 실재론자들과 반실재론자들 사이의 실천적인 차이가 천문학과 역학의 발전에서 상보적인 역할을 수행했음을 보일 것이다. 첫째, 해당 시기 유럽의 전형적인 실재론자와 반실재론자―14세기의 토머스주의자(실재론) 대 유명론자(반실재론), 16세기의 코페르니쿠스(실재론) 대 도구주의 천문학자들(반실재론), 17세기의 갈릴레오(실재론) 대 그의 반대파들(반실재론)―사이에는 과학적 실천에서 분명한 차이가 있었다. 둘째, 실재론자와 반실재론자 그룹 각각의 기여는 다른 그룹에 의해 대체될 수 없었기에, 양쪽의 기여는 협동을 통해 과학의 발전을 추동했다. 추가적으로, 나는 이러한 실재론자과 반실재론자들의 상보적인 역할이 쿤식 전체론이 가진 딜레마에 대한 한 가지 해법을 제공할 수 있음을 보일 것이다.  


== 본문 ==
== 본문 ==
{{제목|The Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists}}
{{제목|The Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists}}<ref>This paper is a revised version of the manuscript presented at APPSA 2023 in Hanoi. I am deeply grateful to the many scholars who provided valuable comments, particularly the two anonymous reviewers.</ref>


{{부제|실재론자와 반실재론자의 상보적 역할}}
{{부제|실재론자와 반실재론자의 상보적 역할}}
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===1. Introduction===
===1. Introduction===


Philosophers of science have discussed scientific realism with a focus on which thesis is right and justified.<ref>Most scientific realists argue that the goal of science is truth and that modern mature sciences have come close to achieving this goal. However, anti-realists contend that the goal of science is not truth, and even if it were, science cannot succeed in reaching it.</ref> However, what does it mean when someone is a realist or an anti-realist? Would there be any difference between realists and anti-realists in actual scientific practice?<ref>Although there is not much literature on this question, Stanford (2015) and Dellsén (2019) have discussed it. While Stanford argues that scientific realists tend to be theoretically conservative, Dellsén rejects Stanford’s argument. According to Stanford, scientific realists lack motivation to search for alternative theories because they believe existing theories are close to the truth, which means that a realist attitide is not beneficial for scientific development. I, like Stanfod, argue that realists and anti-realists have practical differences, but unlike Stanford, I acknowledge their complementary roles.</ref> I believe that there would be a difference. In fact, we can find an obvious difference in scientific practice between the Thomists (realists) vs. the nominalists (anti-realists) during the 14th century; Copernicus (a realist) vs. other contemporary astronomers (instrumentalists) during the 16th century; and Galileo (a realist) vs. his opponents (anti-realists) during the 17th century. In the following, I will show that adopting a realist attitude or an anti-realist attitude indeed makes a difference in scientific practice and this difference had played complementary roles in the development of astronomy and mechanics.
Philosophers of science have discussed scientific realism with a focus on which thesis is right and justified.<ref>Most scientific realists argue that the goal of science is truth and that modern mature sciences have come close to achieving this goal. However, anti-realists contend that the goal of science is not truth, and even if it were, science cannot succeed in reaching it.</ref> However, what does it mean for someone to be a realist or an anti-realist? Would there be any difference between realists and anti-realists in actual scientific practice?<ref>Although there is not much literature on this question, Stanford (2015) and Dellsén (2019) have discussed it. While Stanford argues that scientific realists tend to be theoretically conservative, Dellsén rejects Stanford’s argument. According to Stanford, scientific realists lack motivation to search for alternative theories because they believe existing theories are close to the truth, which means that a realist attitide is not beneficial for scientific development. I, like Stanfod, argue that realists and anti-realists have practical differences, but unlike Stanford, I acknowledge their complementary roles.</ref> I believe that there would be a difference. In fact, we can find an obvious difference in scientific practice between the Thomists (realists) vs. the nominalists (anti-realists) during the 14th century; Copernicus (a realist) vs. other contemporary astronomers (instrumentalists) during the 16th century; and Galileo (a realist) vs. his opponents (anti-realists) during the 17th century. In the following, I will show that adopting a realist attitude or an anti-realist attitude indeed makes a difference in scientific practice and this difference had played complementary roles in the development of astronomy and mechanics.


Further, I will try to apply the lesson from historical episodes to one philosophical problem. Thomas S. Kuhn (1987) notes that it is difficult to modify our belief system piecemeal due to the locally holistic character of our belief system. If we want to modify a part of our belief system, we must modify the related parts together. An immature idea, contradictive or incommensurable to our belief system, is hard to be accepted into our belief system, but a mature idea that could replace our belief system could not be developed without such an immature idea. How can this dilemma be resolved? I have, if not a unique solution, <i>a</i> solution: distinguishing differences between models and reality, which is a lesson from the anti-realist attitude. If we could distinguish between adopting a model as a fiction and adopting the model as real, we could preserve an immature idea as a fictional model and later accept the mature idea grown from the immature idea as real. Thus, modeling, if not motivated by an anti-realist attitude, can play a role in constructing, keeping, conveying, and developing an immature, critical idea. After those immature ideas have accumulated sufficiently, someone can recognize the possibility of integrating them into a complete system and accept them as true. This marks the beginning of a revolution.  
Further, I will try to apply the lesson from historical episodes to one philosophical problem. Thomas S. Kuhn (1987) notes that it is difficult to modify our belief system piecemeal due to the locally holistic character of our belief system. If we want to modify a part of our belief system, we must modify the related parts together. An immature idea, contradictive or incommensurable to our belief system, is hard to be accepted into our belief system, but a mature idea that could replace our belief system could not be developed without such an immature idea. How can this dilemma be resolved? I have, if not a unique solution, <i>a</i> solution: distinguishing differences between models and reality, which is a lesson from the anti-realist attitude. If we could distinguish between adopting a model as a fiction and adopting the model as real, we could preserve an immature idea as a fictional model and later accept the mature idea grown from the immature idea as real. Thus, modeling, if not motivated by an anti-realist attitude, can play a role in constructing, keeping, conveying, and developing an immature, critical idea. After those immature ideas have accumulated sufficiently, someone can recognize the possibility of integrating them into a complete system and accept them as true. This marks the beginning of a revolution.  
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In addition, theologians, seeking to demonstrate God’s absolute power, began to criticize the foundation of Aristotle’s philosophy. According to them, Aristotelian natural philosophy only represents contingent truths, not necessary truths. For example, according to William of Ockham (ca.1280–ca.1349), an eminent philosopher-theologian who made a strong impact on nominalists, God, who has absolute power and free will “can do anything that does not involve a contradiction;” therefore, all things and events are contingent. In addition, because necessary connection between contingent things is impossible, “Aristotelian sense of definitely knowable and necessary cause-effect relationships that had been so widely and, perhaps, uncritically accepted in the thirteenth century” is also impossible. Ockham blocked any reasoning from knowledge of existing things to knowledge of transcendent things (Grant 1971, pp. 29-30). As a result, anti-realist trends, known as nominalism, spread during the 14th century.
In addition, theologians, seeking to demonstrate God’s absolute power, began to criticize the foundation of Aristotle’s philosophy. According to them, Aristotelian natural philosophy only represents contingent truths, not necessary truths. For example, according to William of Ockham (ca.1280–ca.1349), an eminent philosopher-theologian who made a strong impact on nominalists, God, who has absolute power and free will “can do anything that does not involve a contradiction;” therefore, all things and events are contingent. In addition, because necessary connection between contingent things is impossible, “Aristotelian sense of definitely knowable and necessary cause-effect relationships that had been so widely and, perhaps, uncritically accepted in the thirteenth century” is also impossible. Ockham blocked any reasoning from knowledge of existing things to knowledge of transcendent things (Grant 1971, pp. 29-30). As a result, anti-realist trends, known as nominalism, spread during the 14th century.


Even though Ockham’s radical position was not embraced by every philosopher in the 14th century, the idea that explanations of physical phenomena were merely ‘saving the phenomena’ or ‘hypotheses’ became widespread. This thought encouraged scholars to imagine possibilities free from the Aristotelian (physical) necessity. “The characteristic sign of this approach was the phrase <i>secundum imaginationem</i> -- ‘according to the imagination’” (Grant 1971, p. 34). Now, natural philosophers and theologians in the 14th century started to create several worlds and vacuum in their imaginations.
Even though Ockham’s radical position was not embraced by every philosopher in the 14th century, the idea that explanations of physical phenomena were merely ‘saving the phenomena’ or ‘hypotheses’ became widespread. This thought encouraged scholars to imagine possibilities free from the Aristotelian (physical) necessity. “The characteristic sign of this approach was the phrase <i>secundum imaginationem</i> {{--}} ‘according to the imagination’” (Grant 1971, p. 34). Now, natural philosophers and theologians in the 14th century started to create several worlds and vacuum in their imaginations.


===3. The Debate on the Role of Medieval Scholars in the Development of Mechanics===
===3. The Debate on the Role of Medieval Scholars in the Development of Mechanics===
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#Therefore, a vacuum should not exist to avoid this absurd result.  
#Therefore, a vacuum should not exist to avoid this absurd result.  


Medieval scholars, who argued for the existence of a vacuum, tried to attack premise 2. They explored the possibility of the finite motion of bodies in a vacuum by assuming that heavy elements play a role similar to motive force to fall and light elements play a role similar to <i>internal resistance</i> (Grant 2004, p. 408). According to this assumption, a compound heavy body in a vacuum would not fall with infinite speed, because it would encounter some internal resistance by its light elements. Therefore, Aristotle’s assertion that a vacuum should not exist to avoid the aburd result was no longer necessarily true. This imagination about compound bodies led some philosophers, such as Thomas Bradwardine (ca.1290–1349), to an interesting conclusion that two homogeneous compound bodies could fall in a vacuum with finite and equal speed, the same conclusion in Galileo’s <i>De Motu</i> (1590), because two homogeneous compound bodies that contain the same ratio of heavy and light elements would have the same ratio of motive force to internal resistance (Grant 2004, p. 410).  
Medieval scholars, who argued for the existence of a vacuum, tried to attack premise 2. They assumed that heavy elements play a role similar to motive force to fall, while light elements play a role similar to <i>internal resistance</i> (Grant 2004, p. 408). According to this assumption, a compound heavy body in a vacuum would not fall with infinite speed, because it would encounter some internal resistance by its light elements. Therefore, Aristotle’s assertion that a vacuum should not exist to avoid the aburd result was no longer necessarily true. This imagination about compound bodies led some philosophers, such as Thomas Bradwardine (ca.1290–1349), to an interesting conclusion that two homogeneous compound bodies could fall in a vacuum with finite and ''equal'' speed, the same conclusion in Galileo’s <i>De Motu</i> (1590), because two homogeneous compound bodies that contain the same ratio of heavy and light elements would have the same ratio of motive force to internal resistance (Grant 2004, p. 410).  


In sum, Duhem was right that these anti-realist scholars (unintentionally) generated numerous revolutionary ideas that laid the groundwork for later scientific developments: inertia, gravitation, and finite motion in the vacuum. But his praise on the condemnation of 1277 overestimated the nominalists’ critical power. As Grant (1971) insisted, the anti-realist attitude of the nominalists was too weak-kneed to break down Aristotelian natural philosophy and replace it by a new cosmology and physics. The nominalists were satisfied to demonstrate that alternative hypotheses were equally possible, and therefore that Aristotle’s assertions were not <i>necessarily</i> true. In their view, Aristotle’s assertions were simply hypotheses, disprovable by experience and logic. In order to demonstrate this, the nominalists constructed alternative hypotheses that could save the ordinary phenomena and make possible what Aristotle had regarded impossible. With these works, they could not only subdue natural philosophers’ pride, but also defend faith from natural philosophers’ reason. Their works were so successful for their purpose that they did not have to develop their ideas as real solutions for real problems.  
In sum, Duhem was right that these anti-realist scholars (unintentionally) generated numerous revolutionary ideas that laid the groundwork for later scientific developments: inertia, gravitation, and finite motion in the vacuum. But his praise on the condemnation of 1277 overestimated the nominalists’ critical power. As Grant (1971) insisted, the anti-realist attitude of the nominalists was too weak-kneed to break down Aristotelian natural philosophy and replace it by a new cosmology and physics. The nominalists were satisfied to demonstrate that alternative hypotheses were equally possible, and therefore that Aristotle’s assertions were not <i>necessarily</i> true. In their view, Aristotle’s assertions were simply hypotheses, disprovable by experience and logic. In order to demonstrate this, the nominalists constructed alternative hypotheses that could save the ordinary phenomena and make possible what Aristotle had regarded impossible. With these works, they could not only subdue natural philosophers’ pride, but also defend faith from natural philosophers’ reason. Their works were so successful for their purpose that they did not have to develop their ideas as real solutions for real problems.  
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William Wallace (1981, pp. 303-319) argued that Duhem overlooked the fundamental difference between nominalists and revolutionists like Galileo. According to him, Galileo, who championed the scientific revolution, was influenced by the realists, including Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, rather than by nominalists. Further, he noted that the Thomists were as critical of Aristotle as the nominalists. His suggestion is helpful to temper Duhem’s excessive thesis.  
William Wallace (1981, pp. 303-319) argued that Duhem overlooked the fundamental difference between nominalists and revolutionists like Galileo. According to him, Galileo, who championed the scientific revolution, was influenced by the realists, including Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, rather than by nominalists. Further, he noted that the Thomists were as critical of Aristotle as the nominalists. His suggestion is helpful to temper Duhem’s excessive thesis.  


However, Wallace may have overestimated the critical power of the realists, specifically, the Thomists. Before Galileo, Their realism did not aim to replace but rather complete the Aristotelian system. Grant said:  
However, Wallace may have overestimated the critical power of the realists, specifically, the Thomists. Before Galileo, their realism did not aim to replace but rather complete the Aristotelian system. Grant said:  


{{인용|Since Aristotle himself was convinced that he had arrived at a system which represented physical reality, his many followers in the thirteenth century, most notably Thomas Aquinas, were also physical realists, much like Copernicus... [but] their physical realism was, for the most part, indistinguishable from their wholehearted acceptance of Aristotle’s physics and cosmology. (1971, p. 88)}}
{{인용|Since Aristotle himself was convinced that he had arrived at a system which represented physical reality, his many followers in the thirteenth century, most notably Thomas Aquinas, were also physical realists, much like Copernicus... [but] their physical realism was, for the most part, indistinguishable from their wholehearted acceptance of Aristotle’s physics and cosmology. (1971, p. 88)}}
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While Wallace saw the similarity between the Thomists and Galileo concerning their realism, I see a fundamental difference between their realism. It is true that Galileo was a realist, but his realism differed fundamentally from that of the Thomists. The title of his book, <i>Dialougue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems</i>, highlights some crucial points. In the respect that he proposed an <i>alternative</i> system that could save the ordinary phenomena as the Aristotelian could, his approach resembled that of the nominalists in the 14th century. However, unlike the nominalists, who constructed incomplete alternatives and didn’t believe them as true, Galileo developed a <i>complete</i> Copernican system comparable to the Aristotelian one and finally <i>chose</i> one over the other. In this respect, he was a realist.  
While Wallace saw the similarity between the Thomists and Galileo concerning their realism, I see a fundamental difference between their realism. It is true that Galileo was a realist, but his realism differed fundamentally from that of the Thomists. The title of his book, <i>Dialougue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems</i>, highlights some crucial points. In the respect that he proposed an <i>alternative</i> system that could save the ordinary phenomena as the Aristotelian could, his approach resembled that of the nominalists in the 14th century. However, unlike the nominalists, who constructed incomplete alternatives and didn’t believe them as true, Galileo developed a <i>complete</i> Copernican system comparable to the Aristotelian one and finally <i>chose</i> one over the other. In this respect, he was a realist.  


Galileo’s realism stemmed from his dedication to assembling scattered fragments of ideas and completing a new, coherent system. His commitment was driven by his conviction of the possibility of constructing a complete and real alternative to the Aristotelian model. Thus, Galileo’s realist attitude paradoxically emerged as a legacy of the anti-realist attitude of the nominalists.
Galileo’s realism stemmed from his dedication to assembling scattered fragments of ideas and completing a new, coherent system. His commitment was driven by his conviction of the possibility of constructing a complete alternative to the Aristotelian model. Thus, Galileo’s realist attitude paradoxically emerged as a legacy of the anti-realist attitude of the nominalists.


===4. The Complementary Roles of the Realists and the Anti-realists===
===4. The Complementary Roles of the Realists and the Anti-realists===
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