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"The Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists"의 두 판 사이의 차이
The Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists (원본 보기)
2025년 12월 25일 (목) 16:01 판
, 2025년 12월 25일 (목) 16:01→5. Concluding Remarks
잔글 (→5. Concluding Remarks: 그림 추가) |
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DongWook JUNG, "Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists", The Korean Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27(3) (2024), 35-56. | |||
'''국문 초록.''' 이 논문에서 나는 14-17세기 실재론자들과 반실재론자들 사이의 실천적인 차이가 천문학과 역학의 발전에서 상보적인 역할을 수행했음을 보일 것이다. 첫째, 해당 시기 유럽의 전형적인 실재론자와 반실재론자―14세기의 토머스주의자(실재론) 대 유명론자(반실재론), 16세기의 코페르니쿠스(실재론) 대 도구주의 천문학자들(반실재론), 17세기의 갈릴레오(실재론) 대 그의 반대파들(반실재론)―사이에는 과학적 실천에서 분명한 차이가 있었다. 둘째, 실재론자와 반실재론자 그룹 각각의 기여는 다른 그룹에 의해 대체될 수 없었기에, 양쪽의 기여는 협동을 통해 과학의 발전을 추동했다. 추가적으로, 나는 이러한 실재론자과 반실재론자들의 상보적인 역할이 쿤식 전체론이 가진 딜레마에 대한 한 가지 해법을 제공할 수 있음을 보일 것이다. | |||
== 본문 == | == 본문 == | ||
{{제목|Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists}} | {{제목|Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists}} | ||
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I also showed that realists and anti-realists could have been either conservative or progressive, depending on the era. In the 14th century, realists (Thomists) were more conservative than anti-realists (nominalists), while in the 17th century, anti-realists (Galileo’s enemies) were more conservative than realists (Galileo and Kepler). One of the causes of this change was the decreasing power of the the Aristotelian system and the increasing hope for a new system. | I also showed that realists and anti-realists could have been either conservative or progressive, depending on the era. In the 14th century, realists (Thomists) were more conservative than anti-realists (nominalists), while in the 17th century, anti-realists (Galileo’s enemies) were more conservative than realists (Galileo and Kepler). One of the causes of this change was the decreasing power of the the Aristotelian system and the increasing hope for a new system. | ||
Then, how did the Aristotelian system lose its power? And how could Galileo become a realist for a new emerging theory. The answers to these questions may be very complex, but from the above episodes it is natural to address one factor: the accumulation of pieces of alternative ideas to the Aristotelian system. And this answer hints <i>a</i> solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism: the impossibility of peacemeal modification of our belief system. | Then, how did the Aristotelian system lose its power? And how could Galileo become a realist for a new emerging theory. The answers to these questions may be very complex, but from the above episodes it is natural to address one factor: the accumulation of pieces of alternative ideas to the Aristotelian system. And this answer hints <i>a</i> solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism: the impossibility of peacemeal modification of our belief system.[[파일:Impossible piecemeal change.png|Fig 1. Impossible piecemeal change.|섬네일]]Kuhn (1987) said that it is difficult to modify our belief system piecemeal due to the locally holistic character of our belief system. If we want to modify a part of our belief system, we have to modify the related parts together. However, we cannot modify the whole system altogether without modifying parts piecemeal. Piecemeal change like the diagram (Fig. 1) is impossible, because the transitional states are impossible. Then how could scientific revolutions have happened? | ||
[[파일:A solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism.png|대체글=A solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism|섬네일|Fig. 2. A solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism]]A solution to the Kuhn’s dilemma came from the complementary roles of realists and anti-realists. Firstly, some scientists, like anti-realists, can accept new ideas as fictional models not as reality. Accepting an idea as a fictional model (not as reality) lightens the heavy burden of holistic modification of our belief system. They can construct, keep, and develop several models free from their own belief system. Later, some scientists can recognize the possibility of integrating those ideas in to a complete system and accept them as true (Fig. 2). Paradoxically, their realist acceptance would result from the accumulation of fictional models and their confidence in successfully constructing a new system. | |||
Kuhn (1987) said that it is difficult to modify our belief system piecemeal due to the locally holistic character of our belief system. If we want to modify a part of our belief system, we have to modify the related parts together. However, we cannot modify the whole system altogether without modifying parts piecemeal. Piecemeal change like the diagram (Fig. 1) is impossible, because the transitional states are impossible. Then how could scientific revolutions have happened? | |||
[[파일: | |||
A solution to the Kuhn’s dilemma came from the complementary roles of realists and anti-realists. Firstly, some scientists, like anti-realists, can accept new ideas as fictional models not as reality. Accepting an idea as a fictional model (not as reality) lightens the heavy burden of holistic modification of our belief system. They can construct, keep, and develop several models free from their own belief system. Later, some scientists can recognize the possibility of integrating those ideas in to a complete system and accept them as true (Fig. 2). Paradoxically, their realist acceptance would result from the accumulation of fictional models and their confidence in successfully constructing a new system. | |||
Because fictional models do not have to be a necessary part of our belief system, we can create and accumulate them in storage outside of our belief system. In addition, a model, once constructed, can be an external object to be accessed, understood, manipulated, and modified by many people not just by individuals who believe the model is real. After all, this modeling strategy is a valuable method for constructing, keeping, conveying, and developing an immature but critical idea. | Because fictional models do not have to be a necessary part of our belief system, we can create and accumulate them in storage outside of our belief system. In addition, a model, once constructed, can be an external object to be accessed, understood, manipulated, and modified by many people not just by individuals who believe the model is real. After all, this modeling strategy is a valuable method for constructing, keeping, conveying, and developing an immature but critical idea. | ||
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Barker, P., & Goldstein, B. R. (1998), “Realism and Instrumentalism in Sixteenth Century Astronomy: A Reappraisal”, <i>Perspectives on Science</i> 6, 232-258. | Barker, P., & Goldstein, B. R. (1998), “Realism and Instrumentalism in Sixteenth Century Astronomy: A Reappraisal”, <i>Perspectives on Science</i> 6, 232-258. | ||
Biagioli, M. (1990), | Biagioli, M. (1990), “[[갈릴레오, 상징 제작자|Galileo the Emblem Maker]]” <i>Isis</i> 81(2), 230-258. | ||
Clutton-Brock, M. (2005), “Copernicus’s Path to His Cosmology: An Attempted Reconstruction”, <i>Journal for the History of Astronomy</i> 36(2), 197-216. | Clutton-Brock, M. (2005), “Copernicus’s Path to His Cosmology: An Attempted Reconstruction”, <i>Journal for the History of Astronomy</i> 36(2), 197-216. | ||
Copernicus, N. (1992), <i>On the revolutions</i>, translated and commentary by Edward Rosen. Johns Hopkins University Press. | Copernicus, N. (1992), <i>[[천구의 회전에 관하여|On the revolutions]]</i>, translated and commentary by Edward Rosen. Johns Hopkins University Press. | ||
Dear, P. (1987), “Jesuit Mathematical Science and the Reconstitution of Experience in the Early Seventeenth Century”, <i>Studies in History and Philosophy of Science</i> 18, 133-175. | Dear, P. (1987), “Jesuit Mathematical Science and the Reconstitution of Experience in the Early Seventeenth Century”, <i>Studies in History and Philosophy of Science</i> 18, 133-175. | ||
Dellsén, F. (2019), “Should | Dellsén, F. (2019), “Should Scientific Realists Embrace Theoretical Conservatism?”, <i>Studies in History and Philosophy of Science</i> 76, 30–38. | ||
Gingerich, O. (1982), “The Galileo Affair”, <i>Scientific American </i>247, 118-127. | Gingerich, O. (1982), “The Galileo Affair”, <i>Scientific American </i>247, 118-127. | ||
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Kuhn, T. S. (1987), “What are Scientific Revolutions?”, in L. Krüger, L. J. Daston & M. Heidelberger (eds.), <i>The Probabilistic Revolution, Vol. I,</i> (pp. 7-22). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. | Kuhn, T. S. (1987), “What are Scientific Revolutions?”, in L. Krüger, L. J. Daston & M. Heidelberger (eds.), <i>The Probabilistic Revolution, Vol. I,</i> (pp. 7-22). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. | ||
Kuhn, T. S. (1996), <i>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</i>, 3rd<sup> </sup>edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. | Kuhn, T. S. (1996), <i>[[과학혁명의 구조|The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]</i>, 3rd<sup> </sup>edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. | ||
Lindberg, D. C. (2008), <i>The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religous, and Institutional Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450</i>, 2nd edition, University of Chicago Press. | Lindberg, D. C. (2008), <i>The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religous, and Institutional Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450</i>, 2nd edition, University of Chicago Press. | ||
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==관련 항목 == | ==관련 항목 == | ||
* 정동욱 , [[위기 없는 혁명]] | * 정동욱, 정원호, [[위기 없는 혁명: 코페르니쿠스 혁명을 중심으로]] | ||
* 쿤, [[코페르니쿠스 혁명]] | * 쿤, [[코페르니쿠스 혁명]] | ||