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The Complementary Roles of Realists and Anti-Realists (원본 보기)
2025년 12월 25일 (목) 16:14 판
, 2025년 12월 25일 (목) 16:14→4. The Complementary Roles of the Realists and the Anti-realists
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On the other hand, the realist attitude represents a driving force to complete a consistent system. Realists such as Thomas Aquinas were intolerant of inconsistencies between the old and new ideas so that they had to find a way to reconcile the two or select among them. Thus, when a pre-existing theory was well-established, realists were disposed to be conservative, even if they did not want to. However, as the pre-existing theory (the Aristotelian theory) weakened in Galileo’s time, the realist attitude could become a driving force to complete a new consistent system despite facing significant criticism. Galileo serves as a good example of this. | On the other hand, the realist attitude represents a driving force to complete a consistent system. Realists such as Thomas Aquinas were intolerant of inconsistencies between the old and new ideas so that they had to find a way to reconcile the two or select among them. Thus, when a pre-existing theory was well-established, realists were disposed to be conservative, even if they did not want to. However, as the pre-existing theory (the Aristotelian theory) weakened in Galileo’s time, the realist attitude could become a driving force to complete a new consistent system despite facing significant criticism. Galileo serves as a good example of this. | ||
When the pre-existing theory weakened, anti-realists became rather conservative. In fact, Galileo faced strong anti-realist criticisms that Galileo violated the convention of the usage of hypotheses and made a logical mistake, that is, <i>the fallacy of affirming the consequent</i>.<ref>According to this fallacy, it is not valid to reason in the following form: A→B / B // A. From a logical standpoint, | When the pre-existing theory weakened, anti-realists became rather conservative. In fact, Galileo faced strong anti-realist criticisms that Galileo violated the convention of the usage of hypotheses and made a logical mistake, that is, <i>the fallacy of affirming the consequent</i>.<ref>According to this fallacy, it is not valid to reason in the following form: A→B / B // A. From a logical standpoint, every attempt to prove a hypothesis using empirical evidences implied by the hypothesis, as in Galileo’s attempt, commits this fallacy.</ref> They thought that both the Heliocentric and the Geocentric, especially Tychonic, systems could save the heaven’s phenomena (for example, Venus’s phase change) and both theories were simply hypotheses improvable by experience and logic. This usage of hypotheses was exactly the method used by the nominalists and had been considered common sense to the scholars since the Middle Ages. Galileo, however, violated the convention of this usage by insisting that one of the hypotheses was true or better than the other – this usage can be considered a primitive form of the hypothetico-deductive method (Gingerich 1982). As a result, his opponents could not accept Galileo’s reasoning. | ||
This interpretation of the historical episode implies that the criteria of theory choice could be different based on scientists’ epistemic attitude, realist or anti-realist. One might question how anti-realists could have different criteria for theory choice compared to realists. For example, consistency seems to be common criterion for both positions. In response to this question, I would argue that this criterion is a common criterion only if we consider a theory as an object of belief. However, for someone who sees a theory merely as an object to understand or as a calculation tool, (external) consistency doesn’t need to be a important factor in their theory choice. Especially, instrumentalists do not have to consider consistency as a necessary criterion for a good theory. It is natural for scientists with different goals to have different methods and criteria. | This interpretation of the historical episode implies that the criteria of theory choice could be different based on scientists’ epistemic attitude, realist or anti-realist. One might question how anti-realists could have different criteria for theory choice compared to realists. For example, consistency seems to be a common criterion for both positions. In response to this question, I would argue that this criterion is a common criterion only if we consider a theory as an object of belief. However, for someone who sees a theory merely as an object to understand or as a calculation tool, (internal or external) consistency doesn’t need to be a important factor in their theory choice. Especially, instrumentalists do not have to consider consistency as a necessary criterion for a good theory. It is natural for scientists with different goals to have different methods and criteria. | ||
History of astronomy provides another, but somewhat complex, example, in which different criteria for accepting theory between realists and anti-realists played complementary roles. During the Middle Ages, the prevailing astronomy was the Ptolemaic astronomy. However, it conflicted with the Aristotelian physics. Firstly, while Aristotelian system uses a concentric spheres model, the Ptolemaic uses an eccentric deferent-epicycle model. Secondly, while Aristotelian system allowed only uniform circular motion, the Ptolemaic permitted non-uniform motion. Thirdly, while the Aristotelian system was mechanical, the Ptolemaic system was mere mathematical.<ref>For the general history of astronomy, Hoskin (2003) and Hoskin & Gingerich (1997a; 1997b), which emphasize conflicts between the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic system.</ref> | History of astronomy provides another, but somewhat complex, example, in which different criteria for accepting theory between realists and anti-realists played complementary roles. During the Middle Ages, the prevailing astronomy was the Ptolemaic astronomy. However, it conflicted with the Aristotelian physics. Firstly, while Aristotelian system uses a concentric spheres model, the Ptolemaic uses an eccentric deferent-epicycle model. Secondly, while Aristotelian system allowed only uniform circular motion, the Ptolemaic permitted non-uniform motion. Thirdly, while the Aristotelian system was mechanical, the Ptolemaic system was mere mathematical.<ref>For the general history of astronomy, Hoskin (2003) and Hoskin & Gingerich (1997a; 1997b), which emphasize conflicts between the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic system.</ref> | ||
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As a result, Aristotle’s serious followers didn’t believe the Ptolemaic astronomy as true. That is to say, they held an anti-realist view towards the Ptolemaic astronomy. Thus, there was an epistemic hierarchy of physics (philosophy) and astronomy (mathematics).<ref>For the epistemic hierarchy of philosophy (physics) and mathematics (astronomy) in the medieval ages and the early modern period, see Westman (1980) and Dear (1987). In this context of epistemic hierarchy, Biagioli (1990) shows an interesting parallelism between Galileo’s transformation from a mathematician to a philosopher and Heliocentric astronomy’s transformation from a model to reality.</ref> Even though they criticized the Ptolemaic astronomy for lacking a physical explanation, they couldn't ignore its remarkable accuracy in making predictions. Consequently, they accepted the Ptolemaic astronomy as a precise calculation tool not a true system. | As a result, Aristotle’s serious followers didn’t believe the Ptolemaic astronomy as true. That is to say, they held an anti-realist view towards the Ptolemaic astronomy. Thus, there was an epistemic hierarchy of physics (philosophy) and astronomy (mathematics).<ref>For the epistemic hierarchy of philosophy (physics) and mathematics (astronomy) in the medieval ages and the early modern period, see Westman (1980) and Dear (1987). In this context of epistemic hierarchy, Biagioli (1990) shows an interesting parallelism between Galileo’s transformation from a mathematician to a philosopher and Heliocentric astronomy’s transformation from a model to reality.</ref> Even though they criticized the Ptolemaic astronomy for lacking a physical explanation, they couldn't ignore its remarkable accuracy in making predictions. Consequently, they accepted the Ptolemaic astronomy as a precise calculation tool not a true system. | ||
On the other hand, some of late medieval scholars sought a little more realist approach to astronomy. They were piecemeal realists on astronomy. Some astronomers <i>within the Ptolemaic tradition</i>, including Georg Peurbach, Regiomontanus and Copernicus, tried to combine the Ptolemaic model with the Aristotelian solid spheres, while other scholars <i>within the Aristotelian tradition</i>, including Fracastaro and Amici, | On the other hand, some of late medieval scholars sought a little more realist approach to astronomy. They were piecemeal realists on astronomy. Some astronomers <i>within the Ptolemaic tradition</i>, including Georg Peurbach, Regiomontanus and Copernicus, tried to combine the Ptolemaic model with the Aristotelian solid spheres, while other scholars <i>within the Aristotelian tradition</i>, including Fracastaro and Amici, started with concentric spheres model. Copernicus’s innovations emerged from the former tradition, not the latter. | ||
In summary, during the Middle Ages, realists and anti-realists in the astronomy played complementary roles. The anti-realist attitude towards astronomy was <i>necessary</i> for the survival of the Ptolemaic system during the Middle ages. Without their instrumental accepting of the Ptolemaic astronomy, the <i>accurate </i>system―which eventually became the starting point of the Copernican Revolution―would have been discarded due to its conflicts with the Aristotelian system. On the other hand, the realist attitude provided a crucial motive for the innovation of the Ptolemaic system. It is important to note that during the Middle Ages and Copernicus’s lifetime, astronomers’ main motivation to innovate the Ptolemaic astronomy arose from its conflicts with the Aristotelian system, not from theory-observation disagreements.<ref>See Heidelberger (1976), Gingerich (1993), and Jung & Jung (2020), which criticized Kuhn (1957; 1996)’s argument on the crisis of the Ptolemaic astronomy. For the plausible discovery process of Copernicus, see Swerdlow (1976) and Clutton-Brock (2005). They all emphasized that the astronomers’ main motive for innovation was its conflict with the Aristotelian physics.</ref> | In summary, during the Middle Ages, realists and anti-realists in the astronomy played complementary roles. The anti-realist attitude towards astronomy was <i>necessary</i> for the survival of the Ptolemaic system during the Middle ages. Without their instrumental accepting of the Ptolemaic astronomy, the <i>accurate </i>system―which eventually became the starting point of the Copernican Revolution―would have been discarded due to its conflicts with the Aristotelian system. On the other hand, the realist attitude provided a crucial motive for the innovation of the Ptolemaic system. It is important to note that during the Middle Ages and Copernicus’s lifetime, astronomers’ main motivation to innovate the Ptolemaic astronomy arose from its conflicts with the Aristotelian system, not from theory-observation disagreements.<ref>See Heidelberger (1976), Gingerich (1993), and Jung & Jung (2020), which criticized Kuhn (1957; 1996)’s argument on the crisis of the Ptolemaic astronomy. For the plausible discovery process of Copernicus, see Swerdlow (1976) and Clutton-Brock (2005). They all emphasized that the astronomers’ main motive for innovation was its conflict with the Aristotelian physics.</ref> | ||
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I also showed that realists and anti-realists could have been either conservative or progressive, depending on the era. In the 14th century, realists (Thomists) were more conservative than anti-realists (nominalists), while in the 17th century, anti-realists (Galileo’s enemies) were more conservative than realists (Galileo and Kepler). One of the causes of this change was the decreasing power of the the Aristotelian system and the increasing hope for a new system. | I also showed that realists and anti-realists could have been either conservative or progressive, depending on the era. In the 14th century, realists (Thomists) were more conservative than anti-realists (nominalists), while in the 17th century, anti-realists (Galileo’s enemies) were more conservative than realists (Galileo and Kepler). One of the causes of this change was the decreasing power of the the Aristotelian system and the increasing hope for a new system. | ||
Then, how did the Aristotelian system lose its power? And how could Galileo become a realist for a new emerging theory. The answers to these questions may be very complex, but from the above episodes it is natural to address one factor: the accumulation of pieces of alternative ideas to the Aristotelian system. And this answer hints <i>a</i> solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism: the impossibility of peacemeal modification of our belief system.[[파일:Impossible piecemeal change.png|Fig 1. Impossible piecemeal change.|섬네일]]Kuhn (1987) said that it is difficult to modify our belief system piecemeal due to the locally holistic character of our belief system. If we want to modify a part of our belief system, we have to modify the related parts together. However, we cannot modify the whole system altogether without modifying parts piecemeal. | Then, how did the Aristotelian system lose its power? And how could Galileo become a realist for a new emerging theory. The answers to these questions may be very complex, but from the above episodes it is natural to address one factor: the accumulation of pieces of alternative ideas to the Aristotelian system. And this answer hints <i>a</i> solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism: the impossibility of peacemeal modification of our belief system.[[파일:Impossible piecemeal change.png|Fig 1. Impossible piecemeal change.|섬네일]]Kuhn (1987) said that it is difficult to modify our belief system piecemeal due to the locally holistic character of our belief system. If we want to modify a part of our belief system, we have to modify the related parts together. However, on the one hand, we cannot modify the whole system altogether without modifying parts piecemeal. On the other hand, piecemeal change like the diagram (Fig. 1) is impossible, because the transitional states are impossible. Then how could scientific revolutions have happened? | ||
[[파일:A solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism.png|대체글=A solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism|섬네일|Fig. 2. A solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism]]A solution to the Kuhn’s dilemma came from the complementary roles of realists and anti-realists. Firstly, some scientists, like anti-realists, can accept new ideas as fictional models not as reality. Accepting an idea as a fictional model (not as reality) lightens the heavy burden of holistic modification of our belief system. They can construct, keep, and develop several models free from their own belief system. Later, some scientists can recognize the possibility of integrating those ideas in to a complete system and accept them as true (Fig. 2). Paradoxically, their realist acceptance would result from the accumulation of fictional models and their confidence in successfully constructing a new system. | [[파일:A solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism.png|대체글=A solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism|섬네일|Fig. 2. A solution to Kuhn's dilemma of holism]]A solution to the Kuhn’s dilemma came from the complementary roles of realists and anti-realists. Firstly, some scientists, like anti-realists, can accept new ideas as fictional models not as reality. Accepting an idea as a fictional model (not as reality) lightens the heavy burden of holistic modification of our belief system. They can construct, keep, and develop several models free from their own belief system. Later, some scientists can recognize the possibility of integrating those ideas in to a complete system and accept them as true (Fig. 2). Paradoxically, their realist acceptance would result from the accumulation of fictional models and their confidence in successfully constructing a new system. | ||
Because fictional models do not have to be a necessary part of our belief system, we can create and accumulate them in storage outside of our belief system. In addition, a model, once constructed, can be an external object to be accessed, understood, manipulated, and modified by many people not just by individuals who believe the model is real. After all, this modeling strategy is a valuable method for constructing, keeping, conveying, and developing an immature but critical idea. | Because fictional models do not have to be a necessary part of our belief system, we can create and accumulate them in a storage outside of our belief system. In addition, a model, once constructed, can be an external object to be accessed, understood, manipulated, and modified by many people not just by individuals who believe the model is real. After all, this modeling strategy is a valuable method for constructing, keeping, conveying, and developing an immature but critical idea. | ||
One of the fundamental sources of Kuhn’s dilemma of holism, I think, was his portrayal of scientists as uncritical children.<ref>Kuhn (1977) stated that while learning something such as a duck, goose, or swan, the learner acquires the perception to distinguish between them and, in doing so, learns something about (the meanings and the application of) language and nature altogether (reinterpreted in Paul Hoyningen-Huene 1990). Kuhn’s remark, I think, implies that we learn the knowledge of language and the knowledge of nature simultaneously. This may be true for children’s learning. Children may not distinguish between the knowledge of language and that of nature; however, adults often, if not always, distinguish between these components of knowledge. Similarly, while students may not distinguish between the knowledge of the Newtonian model and that of nature, mature physicists can distinguish between them. Thus, Kuhn exaggerated the association between the knowledge of language and that of nature. In other words, he ignored the normal ability of distinguishing between keeping a model as a useful object and believing the model as a natural knowledge. This is why he often described normal scientists as naïve realists trapped in their paradigm while he was rather like an anti-realist free from a paradigm. This is also why normal scientists in his writings, look like children uncritical to their own knowledge. In fact, Kuhn has developed his ability to distinguish between models and reality from the history of science; however, he does not give the same ability to his normal scientists.</ref> My solution to the dilemma is based on depicting scientists as adults. Unlike children, adults do not believe everything they have come to think. They can doubt something in their knowledge, construct an alternative idea, and keep it as a model for later development. In doing so, they can escape from their pre-existing belief network and keep an immature yet critical idea. Later, these ideas can be integrated into a complete whole, which can be accepted as true. This is my solution to Kuhn’s dilemma of holism. | One of the fundamental sources of Kuhn’s dilemma of holism, I think, was his portrayal of scientists as uncritical children.<ref>Kuhn (1977) stated that while learning something such as a duck, goose, or swan, the learner acquires the perception to distinguish between them and, in doing so, learns something about (the meanings and the application of) language and nature altogether (reinterpreted in Paul Hoyningen-Huene 1990). Kuhn’s remark, I think, implies that we learn the knowledge of language and the knowledge of nature simultaneously. This may be true for children’s learning. Children may not distinguish between the knowledge of language and that of nature; however, adults often, if not always, distinguish between these components of knowledge. Similarly, while students may not distinguish between the knowledge of the Newtonian model and that of nature, mature physicists can distinguish between them. Thus, Kuhn exaggerated the association between the knowledge of language and that of nature. In other words, he ignored the normal ability of distinguishing between keeping a model as a useful object and believing the model as a natural knowledge. This is why he often described normal scientists as naïve realists trapped in their paradigm while he was rather like an anti-realist free from a paradigm. This is also why normal scientists in his writings, look like children uncritical to their own knowledge. In fact, Kuhn has developed his ability to distinguish between models and reality from the history of science; however, he does not give the same ability to his normal scientists.</ref> My solution to the dilemma is based on depicting scientists as adults. Unlike children, adults do not believe everything they have come to think. They can doubt something in their knowledge, construct an alternative idea, and keep it as a model for later development. In doing so, they can escape from their pre-existing belief network and keep an immature yet critical idea. Later, these ideas can be integrated into a complete whole, which can be accepted as true. This is my solution to Kuhn’s dilemma of holism. | ||
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Clutton-Brock, M. (2005), “Copernicus’s Path to His Cosmology: An Attempted Reconstruction”, <i>Journal for the History of Astronomy</i> 36(2), 197-216. | Clutton-Brock, M. (2005), “Copernicus’s Path to His Cosmology: An Attempted Reconstruction”, <i>Journal for the History of Astronomy</i> 36(2), 197-216. | ||
Copernicus, N. (1992), <i>[[천구의 회전에 관하여|On the | Copernicus, N. (1992), <i>[[천구의 회전에 관하여|On the Revolutions]]</i>, translated and commentary by Edward Rosen. Johns Hopkins University Press. | ||
Dear, P. (1987), “Jesuit Mathematical Science and the Reconstitution of Experience in the Early Seventeenth Century”, <i>Studies in History and Philosophy of Science</i> 18, 133-175. | Dear, P. (1987), “Jesuit Mathematical Science and the Reconstitution of Experience in the Early Seventeenth Century”, <i>Studies in History and Philosophy of Science</i> 18, 133-175. | ||
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Kuhn, T. S. (1996), <i>[[과학혁명의 구조|The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]</i>, 3rd<sup> </sup>edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. | Kuhn, T. S. (1996), <i>[[과학혁명의 구조|The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]</i>, 3rd<sup> </sup>edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. | ||
Lindberg, D. C. (2008), <i>The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, | Lindberg, D. C. (2008), <i>The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450</i>, 2nd edition, University of Chicago Press. | ||
Rosen, E. (1937), “Commentariolus of Copernicus”, <i>Osiris</i> 3, 123-141. | Rosen, E. (1937), “Commentariolus of Copernicus”, <i>Osiris</i> 3, 123-141. | ||